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Abstract. This paper presents an agent-based approach for error detection in 
incident management organizations. The approach consists of several parts. 
First, a formal approach for the specification and hierarchical verification of 
both traces and properties. Incomplete traces are enriched by enrichment rules. 
Furthermore, a classification mechanism is presented for the different properties 
in incident management that is based on psychological literature. Classification 
of errors provides insight in the functioning of the agents involved with respect 
to their roles. This insight enables the provision of dedicated training sessions 
and allows software support to give appropriate warning messages during 
incident management. 
1   Introduction 
The domain of incident management is characterized by sudden events which demand 
immediate, effective and efficient response. Due to the nature of incident management, 
those involved in such processes need to be able to cope with stress situations and high 
work pressure. In addition to that, cooperation between these people is crucial and is not 
trivial due to the involvement of multiple organizations with different characteristics 
(e.g. police, health care, fire department). As a result of these difficulties, often errors 
occur in an incident management process. If such errors are not handled properly, this 
may have great impact on the successfulness of incident management. 
Research within the domain of computer science and artificial intelligence is being 
performed to see whether automated systems can improve the current state of affairs 
in incident management (see e.g. [12]). One of the problems is that the information 
available is incomplete and possibly contradictory and unreliable. As a result, more 
advanced techniques are needed to enable automated systems to contribute an 
improvement of the incident management process. 
This paper presents an agent-based approach to monitor, analyze and support 
incident management processes by detecting occurring errors and providing support to 
avoid such errors or to limit their consequences. The approach is tailored towards the 
characteristics of incident management. First of all, the approach includes a method 
which deals with incomplete information. In addition, a diagnostic method based on 
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refinement within the approach can signal whether certain required properties of the 
incident management organization are not satisfied, and pinpoint the cause within the 
organization of this dissatisfaction. The approach is based on the organizational 
paradigm nowadays in use in agent systems [1,4] which allows the abstraction from 
individual agents to the level of roles. Such an abstraction is useful as typically 
specification of the requirements in this domain is done on the level of roles (e.g. the 
police chief should communicate a strategy for crowd control). In case errors are 
observed in role behavior, they are classified to have more insight in what kind of 
errors are often made by a particular agent participating in the organization, in order to 
propose a tailored training program for this agent. In the future the approach as a whole 
can be incorporated in cooperating software agents for monitoring and providing 
feedback in training sessions, and software agents which can even monitor incident 
management organizations on the fly, giving a signal as soon as errors are detected, 
and providing support to avoid their occurrence or to limit their consequences. 
Section 2 introduces the domain of incident management and, more specifically, the 
situation in the Netherlands. Thereafter, Section 3 introduces the formal language used 
to specify traces and behavior. Section 4 presents an approach for handling incomplete 
information by means of enrichment rules whereas Section 5 presents properties in the 
form of hierarchies for incident management organizations. Furthermore, Section 6 
presents the classification scheme for errors, including specific incident management 
decision rules. Results of a case study are presented in Section 7 and finally, Section 8 
is a discussion. 
2   The Domain of Incident Management 
In this Section, a brief introduction to the domain of incident management in the 
Netherlands is given. In the Netherlands four core organizations are present within 
incident management: (1) the fire department; (2) the police department; (3) health 
care, and (4) the municipalities involved. The first three parties mentioned each have 
their own alarm center in which operators are present to handle tasks associated with 
the specific organization. 
A trigger for starting up an incident management organization is typically a call to 
the national emergency number, which is redirected to the nearest regional alarm 
center in which all three parties have their own alarm center. The call will be 
redirected to the most appropriate alarm center of the three parties. In case the 
operator of that alarm center considers the incident to be severe enough to start up the 
full incident management organization, he informs the alarm centers of the other 
organizations as well. Initially, the three alarm centers will send the manpower they 
think is appropriate for the incident reported. After the manpower has arrived on the 
scene, each part of the organization in principle acts on its own, each having a 
different coordinator of actions. In the case of the fire department this is the 
commander of the first truck to arrive, for health care it is the paramedic of the first 
ambulance and for the police there is no such coordinator as they have a supporting 
role. Each of the coordinators are in charge until the dedicated operational leaders of 
the organization arrive at the scene. The responsibilities of the organizations are 
briefly described as follows: the fire department takes care of the so called “cause and 
effect prevention”, the health care organization is in charge of providing medical care, 
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and the police takes care of routing of the various vehicles and crowd control. After 
the initial phase without structural coordination, an organization is formed in order to 
coordinate all actions of the individual organizations in case this is still necessary. 
The fire department is in charge of the operational side of this organization and the 
mayor of the municipality is in charge of the policy part. The mayor is responsible for 
the formation of the disaster staff for coordinating policy decisions, and is therefore 
informed of the situation. The operational coordination structures are formed after 
deliberation between the various parties on the scene has resulted in a mutual demand 
for such a coordination structure. In case it is decided to form the operational and/or 
disaster staff, the operators of the alarm centers start warning the relevant people. For 
more details on the full coordination structure, see [8].  
3   Modeling Method Used 
This section describes the language TTL (for Temporal Trace Language) [6] used for 
expressing dynamic properties as well as the expression of traces. Furthermore, the 
language meta-TTL is introduced for second-order dynamic properties. 
3.1   The Language TTL for Dynamic Properties 
In TTL [6], ontologies for states are formalized as sets of symbols in sorted predicate 
logic. For any ontology Ont, the ground atoms form the set of basic state properties 
BSTATPROP(Ont). Basic state properties can be defined by nullary predicates (or 
proposition symbols) such as hungry, or by using n-ary predicates (with n>0) like 
has_temperature(environment, 7). The state properties based on a certain ontology Ont are 
formalized by the propositions (using conjunction, negation, disjunction, implication) 
made from the basic state properties and constitute the set STATPROP(Ont).  
In order to express dynamics in TTL, important concepts are states, time points, 
and traces. A state S is an indication of which basic state properties are true and 
which are false, i.e., a mapping S: BSTATPROP(Ont) → {true, false}. The set of all possible 
states for ontology Ont is denoted by STATES(Ont). Moreover, a fixed time frame T is 
assumed which is linearly ordered. Then, a trace γ over a state ontology Ont and time 
frame T is a mapping γ : T → STATES(Ont), i.e., a sequence of states γt (t ∈ T)
 
in  STATES(Ont). 
The set of all traces over ontology Ont is denoted by TRACES(Ont).  
The set of dynamic properties DYNPROP(Ont) is the set of temporal statements that 
can be formulated with respect to traces based on the state ontology Ont in the 
following manner. Given a trace γ over state ontology Ont, a certain state at time point t 
is denoted by state(γ, t). These states can be related to state properties via the formally 
defined satisfaction relation, indicated by the infix predicate |=, comparable to the 
Holds-predicate in the Situation Calculus. Thus, state(γ, t) |= p denotes that state property p 
holds in trace γ at time t. Likewise, state(γ, t) |≠ p denotes that state property p does not 
hold in trace γ at time t. Based on these statements, dynamic properties can be 
formulated in a formal manner in a sorted predicate logic, using the usual logical 
connectives such as ¬, ∧, ∨, ⇒, and the quantifiers ∀, ∃ (e.g., over traces, time and 
state properties). For example, consider the following dynamic property for a pattern 
concerning belief creation based on observation: 
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if  at any point in time t1 the agent observes that the situation is a disaster,  
then  there exists a time point t2 after t1 such that 
at t2 in the trace the agent believes that the situation is a disaster 
This property can be expressed as a dynamic property in TTL form with free variable 
γ as follows: 
             ∀t:T [ state(γ, t) |= observes(itsadisaster) ⇒ ∃t' ≥ t  state(γ, t') |= belief(itsadisaster) ] 
The set DYNPROP(Ont, γ)  is the subset of DYNPROP(Ont)  consisting of formulae with γ 
occurring in which is either a constant or a variable without being bound by a 
quantifier. For a more elaborate explanation of TTL, see [6]. 
3.2   The Language Meta-TTL for Second-Order Dynamic Properties 
The formalizations of the properties sometimes take the form of second-order 
dynamic properties, i.e., properties that refer to dynamic properties expressed within 
TTL. Such second-order dynamic properties are expressed in meta-TTL: the meta-
language of TTL. The language meta-TTL includes sorts for DYNPROP(Ont) and its 
subsets as indicated above, which contain TTL-statements (for dynamic properties) as 
term expressions. Moreover, a predicate holds on these sorts can be used to express 
that such a TTL formula is true. When no confusion is expected, this predicate can be 
left out. To express second-order dynamic properties, in a meta-TTL statement, 
quantifiers over TTL statements can be used. 
4   Handling Incompleteness of Information by Enrichment Rules 
The trace of occurrences as logged during or reported from an incident management 
process usually is incomplete and therefore difficult to analyze. To overcome this 
incompleteness problem, additional assumptions have to be made on events that have 
occurred but are not explicitly mentioned in the logged trace. Such assumptions are 
addressed in this section. These extra assumptions enrich the trace with elements that 
are derived from the information in the trace itself, for example at later time points in 
case an analysis is performed afterwards. An example is the assumption that if at 
some time point an estimation of the situation is communicated, then at previous time 
points the necessary information to make that assessment was received or observed by 
the communicating role. 
Addition of such elements to enrich a trace are based on rules which express that 
given certain trace elements, an additional element can be assumed. These rules in 
principle can be of two forms: Strict rules which can always be applied and provide 
conclusions that are certain, and defeasible rules which are used in case strict rules are 
insufficient to obtain a trace with a reasonable amount of information. However, it is 
not always possible to claim that a rule is a strict rule. Therefore, such rules are 
considered premises for the whole analysis. 
Examples of such rules are presented below. Rule EP1 states that everybody 
present on the scene is assumed to have an internal judgment about the seriousness of 
the disaster: 
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EP1: Internal judgment at scene 
if at time t role R is present at the scene 
 and situation S is the case 
 and S is classified as being a disaster 
then there exists a later point in time t2 < t+d at which R has an internal judgment that this 
situation is a disaster 
Formal: 
∀ R:ROLE, t:TIME, S:SITUATION 
[state(γ, t) |= physical_position(R, scene) & 
 state(γ, t) |= current_situation(S) & 
 state(γ, t) |= disaster(S)] 
⇒ ∃t2>t & t2 < t+d  [state(γ, t2) |= internal_judgment(R, disaster(S))] 
 
Furthermore, in case a role receives a communication that the situation is a disaster 
and this role does not communicate that he does not believe it being a disaster, then it 
is assumed that he has the internal judgment that it concerns a disaster: 
EP2: Internal judgment based on communication 
if at time t R1 communicates to R2 that the current situation S is a disaster 
 and there exists no time point at which R2 communicates to R1 he thinks the situation is not  
a disaster 
then at every time point t2 > t R2 interprets the current state of affairs as being a disaster 
 
∀R1,R2:ROLE, P:POSITION, t:TIME, S:SITUATION 
[state(γ, t) |= communication_from_to(R1, R2, disaster(S)) & 
 ¬∃t’>t [state(γ, t’) |= communication_from_to(R2, R1, not(disaster(S)))]] 
⇒ ∀t2 > t  [state(γ, t2) |= internal_judgment(R2, disaster(S))] 
5   Property Hierarchies for Incident Management Organizations 
This section presents generic properties for incident management organizations in the 
Netherlands. The properties are presented in property hierarchies, which has as an 
advantage that diagnosis of properties can be done in a top down fashion. Such a 
diagnostic process starts by checking highest level property, and in case such a 
property is not satisfied pinpoints the error by gradually going down the tree to the 
unsatisfied properties. 
5.1   Warning of Relevant Parties 
The warning of relevant parties by the operator is a high level property stating that: 
“the operator should alarm all necessary parties in case it is informed of an incident”: 
P1(d): Warn relevant parties 
if at time t the operator is informed about an incident type I by a role R1, 
 and for incident type I role R2 should be informed according to the disaster plan 
then there exists a time t2 later than t and before t + d at which R2 is informed about the 
incident type I 
 
∀I:INCIDENT_TYPE, t:TIME, R1, R2:ROLE 
[state(γ, t) |= communication_from_to(R1, operator, I) & 
  state(γ, t) |= according_to_plan_should_be_involved_in(R2, I)] 
 ⇒ ∃t2 > t & t2 < t + d [state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(operator, R2, I)]] 
This property can be refined into a number of similar properties restricted to specific 
categories of roles that should be informed. For diagnosis, at the highest level 
property P1(d) can be checked, for example with the result that P1(d) is not satisfied 
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which means that not all relevant parties were informed (but without information on 
which specific categories were not informed). At one level lower, the diagnosis can be 
refined by checking the refined properties, resulting in an indication of which of the 
categories of relevant roles were not informed. 
5.2   First Arriving Ambulance 
Second, the behavior of the first arriving ambulance is addressed. First, a formal 
definition of the first arriving ambulance is given: 
first_arriving_ambulance(γ:TRACE, t:TIME, A:AMBULANCE) 
An ambulance is the first arriving ambulance if: 
the ambulance arrives at the scene of an incident at time t 
and there does not exist a time t’ < t at which another ambulance arrived at the scene of the 
incident 
 [state(γ, t) |=physical_position(A, scene) & ¬∃t’< t, [∃B:AMBULANCE [state(γ, t’) |=physical_position(B, scene)]] 
On the highest level, the first arriving ambulance behavior is described by three 
important aspects: (1) signaling the green alarm light; (2) communicating a situation 
report, and (3) presence of at least one person belonging to the ambulance until the 
officer on duty arrives at the scene: 
P2: First arriving ambulance global behavior 
if  at a time t ambulance A is the first to arrive at the scene 
 and at time t3 > t the officer on duty arrives at the scene 
then for all t2 ≥ t and t2 < t3 at least one person belonging to the ambulance should be 
present at the ambulance 
 and for all t4 ≥ t the ambulance is signaling the green alarm light 
 and there exists a time t5 later than t at which the driver of that ambulance communicates a  
correct interpretation of the situation to the operator. 
 
∀A:AMBULANCE, t, t2:TIME  
[first_arriving_ambulance(γ, t, A) & 
state(γ, t2) |= physical_position(officer_on_duty, scene) & 
 ¬∃t’’’< t2 [state(γ, t’’’) |= physical_position(officer_on_duty, scene)]] 
⇒ 
∀t3 < t2 
     [t3 ≥ t ⇒  [∃R:ROLE [state(γ, t3) |= physical_position(R, A)]]]  
 & ∀t4 > t  [state(γ, t4) |= alarm_lights(A, green)] 
 & ∃t5 > t, X:SITUATION[ state(γ, t5) |= communication_from_to(driver, operator, situation_description(X)) &  
                                         situtation(X)]] 
This property can be related to lower level 
properties as shown in Figure 1. When trying 
to diagnose why the highest level property is 
not satisfied, the properties on the lower 
level can be checked. In case such a property 
is not satisfied, and it concerns a leaf 
property, at least one cause for the non-
fulfillment of the high-level property has 
been found. Otherwise, go further down the 
tree to find the cause. In the tree a number of 
properties are present to enable satisfaction of P2. First of all, the signaling of the 
green light, as expressed below. 
 
P2 
P3 P5 P4 
P6 P7 P8 
Fig. 1. Property hierarchy for the first 
arriving ambulance 
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P3: First ambulance green light behavior 
if  at a time t ambulance A is the first to arrive at the scene 
then for all later points in time t2 the ambulance is signaling the green light. 
 
∀A:AMBULANCE, t:TIME 
 [first_arriving_ambulance(γ, t, A)  ⇒ ∀t2:TIME > t [state(γ, t2) |= alarm_lights(A, green)]] 
 
Second, the presence of a person belonging to the ambulance for the time until the 
officer on duty is  present: 
P4: First arriving ambulance personnel presence 
if  at a time t ambulance A is the first to arrive at the scene 
 and at time t3 > t the officer on duty arrives at the scene 
then for all t2 ≥ t and t2 < t3 at least one person belonging to the ambulance should be 
present at the ambulance 
 
∀A:AMBULANCE, t, t2:TIME 
[first_arriving_ambulance(γ, t, A) & 
 state(γ, t2) |= physical_position(officer_on_duty, scene) & 
 ¬∃t’’’< t2 [state(γ, t’’’) |= physical_position(officer_on_duty, scene)]] 
⇒ ∀t3 < t2 [t3 ≥ t ⇒ [∃R:ROLE [state(γ, t3) |= physical_position(R, A)]]] 
Finally, a property expressing the communication of the correct situation to the 
operator: 
P5(d): First arriving ambulance interpretation 
if  at a time t ambulance A is the first to arrive at the scene 
then at a later point in time t2 < t + d the driver of that ambulance communicates a correct 
interpretation of the situation  
 
∀A:AMBULANCE, t:TIME 
first_arriving_ambulance(γ, t, A) 
⇒ ∃X:SITUATION, t2:TIME < t + d & t2>t 
        state(γ, t2) |= physical_position(driver, A) & 
        state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(driver, operator, situation_description(X)) & 
        state(γ, t2) |= situtation(X)] 
Note that parameter d includes the time to interpret the situation plus the time to start 
communicating that particular interpretation. Testing whether the interpretation was 
correct can be performed afterwards (e.g., the amount of casualties). The property P5 
can be refined again into three lower level properties. First of all, when arriving at the 
scene, the paramedic should investigate the current state of affairs: 
P6(d): Paramedic investigation 
if at a time t ambulance A is the first to arrive at the scene 
 and at time t a paramedic is in the ambulance 
then at a later point in time t2 < t + d the paramedic of that ambulance will start an 
investigation and not be at the ambulance any more 
 
∀A:AMBULANCE, t:TIME 
[first_arriving_ambulance(γ, t, A) & 
 state(γ, t) |= physical_position(paramedic, A)]] 
⇒ ∃t2:TIME < t + d & t2 > t 
       [state(γ, t2) |= not physical_position(paramedic, A) & state(γ, t2) |= investigating(paramedic)] 
Second, the paramedic will return, communicating the current situation: 
P7(d): Paramedic communication 
if at a time t ambulance A is the first to arrive at the scene 
 and at time t the paramedic is in the ambulance 
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 and at time t2 the physical position of the paramedic is not inside the ambulance 
then at a later point in time t3 < t2 + d the paramedic of that ambulance will communicate a 
correct interpretation of the situation to the driver 
 
∀A:AMBULANCE, t,t2:TIME 
[first_arriving_ambulance(γ, t, A) & 
 state(γ, t) |= physical_position(paramedic, A) & t2 > t & 
 state(γ, t2) |= not physical_position(paramedic, A) & 
 state(γ, t2) |= investigating(paramedic)] 
⇒ ∃t3:TIME < t2 + d & t3 > t2, X:SITUATION 
    [state(γ, t3) |= physical_position(paramedic, A) & 
     state(γ, t3) |= communication_from_to(paramedic, driver, situation_description(X)) & 
     state(γ, t3) |= situtation(X)] 
Finally, once the driver has received the communication, he will communicate this to 
the operator: 
P8(d): Driver communication 
if at a time t the driver of the first ambulance at the scene receives a situation description 
from the paramedic 
then at a later point in time t2 < t + d the driver of that ambulance communicates a correct 
interpretation of the situation to the operator 
 
∀A:AMBULANCE, t,t2:TIME, X :SITUATION 
[first_arriving_ambulance(γ, t, A) & 
 state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(paramedic, driver, situation_description(X)) 
⇒ ∃t3:TIME < t2 + d & t2 > t [state(γ, t3) |= communication_from_to(driver, operator, situation_description(X))] 
5.3   Disaster Staff Activation 
Furthermore, properties have been specified for the formation of the disaster staff and 
activities following from the disaster staff. On the highest level the correctness of these 
processes in the disaster staff can be described as follows: In case the operator has the 
internal judgment that the current situation is a disaster, the operational leader will 
eventually output actions belonging to a strategy communicated by the disaster staff. 
P9: Successful disaster staff 
if at time t the operator judges the current situation as a disaster 
then there exists a later point in time t2 at which the disaster staff communicated a strategy 
and there exists an even later time at which the operational leader communicates an action  
appropriate for the strategy according to the disaster plan. 
 
∀t:TIME 
[state(γ, t) |= internal_judgement(operator, disaster) 
 ⇒ ∃t2:TIME > t, S:STRATEGY 
       [state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(disaster_staff, operational_leader, S) & 
        ∃t3:TIME > t2, A:ACTION, R:ROLE 
        [state(γ, t3) |= appropriate_action_according_to_plan(S, A) & 
         state(γ, t3) |= accompanying_role(A, R)] & 
         state(γ, t3) |= communication_from_to(operational_leader, R, perform(A))] 
Such properties can be related to lower-level properties as shown in Figure 2. On the 
intermediate level, three properties are present. First, the correct initiation of a disaster 
staff is expressed: 
P10: Correctly activated disaster staff 
if at time t the operator interprets the current situation being a disaster 
then at a later point in time t2 the disaster staff will be informed (and assumed to be present 
as a result) 
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Fig. 2. Property hierarchy for the disaster staff activation and functioning 
 
∀t:TIME, R:ROLE 
[state(γ, t) |= internal_judgement(operator, disaster) & 
 state(γ, t) |= part_of(R, disaster_staff) 
 ⇒ ∃t2:TIME > t  + d [state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(operator, R, form_disaster_staff)]] 
Thereafter, in case the disaster staff is formed, it should be active, which is 
characterized by an output in the form of a strategy: 
P11: Active disaster staff 
if at time t the organizational unit called disaster staff is informed 
then at a later point in time t2 > t the organizational unit outputs a strategy S 
 
∀t:TIME 
[state(γ, t2) |= part_of(R, disaster_staff) & 
 state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(operator, R, form_disaster_staff) 
 ⇒ ∃S:STRATEGY, t2 > t [state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(disaster_staff, operational_leader, S)] 
Finally, such a strategy should lead to actions be taken by the operational leader: 
P12: Active operational leader 
if at time t the operational leader is informed of a strategy S to be applied 
then at a later point in time t2 > t the operational leader will command the appropriate actions 
according to the disaster plan to the roles. 
 
∀t:TIME, S:STRATEGY, A:ACTION, R:ROLE 
[state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(disaster_staff, operational_leader, S) & 
 state(γ, t) |= appropriate_action_according_to_plan (S, A) & 
 state(γ, t) |= accompanying_role(A, R) 
 ⇒ ∃t2:TIME > t state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(operational_leader, R, perform(A))] 
Each of these intermediate properties can again be split up to properties for individual 
roles within the organization. In order to obtain property P10 a number of properties 
need to hold. First of all, the mayor should be warned by the operator: 
P13(d): Warn mayor 
if at time t the operator interprets the current situation being a disaster 
then at a later point in time t2 > t and t2 < t +d the operator communicates the occurrence of 
a disaster to the mayor. 
 
∀t:TIME 
[state(γ, t) |= internal_judgement(operator, disaster) & 
⇒ ∃t2:TIME > t & t2 < t + d [state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(operator, mayor, disaster)] 
Thereafter, the mayor should decide to form the disaster staff: 
P14: Form disaster staff 
if at time point t the mayor interprets the current state of affairs as being a disaster 
then at a later point in time t2 > t the mayor forms the organizational unit called disaster staff 
 
P9 
P10 P11  P12 
P13 P15 P14 P16 P17 P18 P19 
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∀t:TIME 
[state(γ, t) |= internal_judgement(mayor, disaster) & 
 ¬∃t’< t [state(γ, t’) |= internal_judgement(mayor, disaster)] & 
 ⇒ ∃t2 > t [state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(mayor, operator, form_disaster_staff)] 
Finally, in case the mayor communicates the decision to form the disaster staff, the 
operator should warn the appropriate parties: 
P15(d): Warn rest disaster staff 
if at time t the operator receives the request of the mayor to form the disaster staff 
 and role R is part of the disaster staff 
then at a later point in time t2 > t and t2 < t +d the operator communicates to role R that the 
disaster staff is being formed. 
 
 
∀t:TIME, R:ROLE 
state(γ, t) |= communication_from_to(mayor, operator, form_disaster_staff) & 
state(γ, t) |= part_of(R, disaster_staff) 
⇒ ∃t2:TIME > t  + d [state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(operator, R, form_disaster_staff)]] 
Regarding the intermediate property P11 the following properties need to hold for 
satisfaction of the intermediate property. First, after the mayor has decided to form the 
disaster staff he will eventually request advice from his disaster staff. 
P16: Start deliberation 
if at time t the mayor decides to form the disaster staff 
then at a later point in time t2 > t the mayor starts a deliberation within the disaster staff by 
requesting advice 
 
∀t:TIME 
[state(γ, t) |= communication_from_to(mayor, operator, form_disaster) 
 ⇒ ∃t2:TIME > t [state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(mayor, disaster_staff, request_advice)]] 
After such advice is received, he should choose the appropriate strategy: 
P17: Choose strategy 
if at time t starts a deliberation within the disaster staff by requesting advice 
then at a later point in time t2 the mayor communicates a strategy to the operational leader 
 
∀t:TIME 
[state(γ, t) |= communication_from_to(mayor, disaster_staff, request_advice) 
 ⇒ ∃S:STRATEGY, t2:TIME > t state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(mayor, operational_leader, S)] 
Finally, the intermediate property P12 is refined to two other properties. First, the 
operational leader should discuss the strategy with his operational team: 
P18: Choose action 
if at time t the mayor communicates a strategy S to the operational leader 
then at a later point in time t2 > t the operational leader requests his operational team for 
advice how to implement S 
 
∀t:TIME, S:STRATEGY 
[state(γ, t) |= communication_from_to(mayor, operational_leader, S) 
 ⇒ 
 ∃ t2:TIME > t state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(operational_leader, operational_team, request_advice(S))] 
Finally, the operational leader communicates actions to be performed, based on the 
advices obtained in the discussion. 
P19: Communicate action 
if at time t the operational leader request his operational team for advice how to 
implement S 
then at a later point in time t2 the operational leader will communicate actions appropriate for 
strategy S according to the disaster plan 
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∀t:TIME, S:STRATEGY, A:ACTION, R:ROLE 
[state(γ, t) |= communication_from_to(operational_leader, operational_team, request_advice(S)) & 
 state(γ, t) |= appropriate_action_according_to_plan (S, A) & 
 state(γ, t) |= accompanying_role(A, R) 
 ⇒ ∃ t2:TIME > t state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(operational_leader, R, perform(A))] 
5.4   Ambulance Routing 
Finally, properties are specified regarding ambulance routing. The police should act 
as follows: 
P20: Route plan includes all wounded nests  
if at time t there are n wounded nests 
and at a later time point t2 > t the police communicates details concerning the route to be 
taken by the ambulances to cpa (the central ambulance post) 
then this communication should contain such a route description that ambulances will be 
sent to all wounded nests. 
 
∀W:WOUNDED_NEST, R:ROUTE_PLAN, t:TIME 
[state(γ, t) |= physical_position(W, scene) & 
 state(γ, t) |= communication_from_to(police, cpa, R)] 
 ⇒ state(γ, t) |= route_passes_wounded_nest(R, W) 
An alternative property not following standard procedure expresses that the routing is 
done based explicitly on victim locations: 
P21: Send ambulance to all wounded on the scene  
if at time t there is a wounded person at a position P 
then at a later time point t2 an ambulance will be sent to position P 
 and at an even later time point t3 that ambulance will be at position P 
 
∀W:WOUNDED, P:POSITION, A:AMBULANCE, t:TIME 
[state(γ, t) |= physical_position(W, P) & 
⇒ ∃t2 > t  [state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(operator, A, goto(P))] & 
     ∃t3 > t2  [state(γ, t3) |= physical_position(A, P) 
This high-level property can be decomposed into three other properties. First of all, a 
wounded person will result in a communication to the operator of the physical 
position of this wounded person: 
P22: Communicate wounded location 
if at time t there is a wounded person at a position P 
then at a later time point t2 this position will be communicated to the operator 
 
∀W:WOUNDED, P:POSITION, t:TIME 
[state(γ, t) |= physical_position(W, P) & 
⇒ ∃R:ROLE, t2 > t  [state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(R, operator, physical_position(W, P))]] 
For every communication received by the operator, he eventually communicates the 
location to an ambulance: 
P23: Send ambulance to wounded 
if at time t a wounded person is communicated to be at a position P 
then at a later time point t2 an ambulance will be sent to position P 
 
∀W:WOUNDED, P:POSITION, R:ROLE, t:TIME 
[state(γ, t) |= communication_from_to(R, operator, physical_position(W, P)) 
⇒ ∃t2 > t, A:AMBULANCE  [state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(operator, A, goto(P))]] 
Finally, once the ambulance gets this communication it will arrive at the location at a 
later point in time: 
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P24: Ambulance arrives at wounded 
if at time point t an ambulance is sent to position P 
then at a later time point t2 that ambulance will be at position P 
 
∀P:POSITION, A:AMBULANCE, t:TIME 
[state(γ, t2) |= communication_from_to(operator, A, goto(P)) 
 ⇒ ∃t2 > t  [state(γ, t3) |= physical_position(A, P) 
6   Human Error Types 
This Section presents a classification scheme for the properties in incident 
management. Such a classification can help to determine the dedicated training 
needed. The human error classification presented by James Reason [9] is therefore 
adopted, who introduces a General Error Modeling approach which identifies three 
basic error types: (1) skill based slips; (2) rule based mistakes, and (3) knowledge 
based mistakes. This classification scheme is also used in [2] in which incident 
management is investigated. Rule based, and knowledge based errors come into play 
after the individual has become conscious of a problem, which is not the case for skill 
based slips. In that sense, skill based errors generally precede detection of the problem 
whereas rule based and skill based mistakes arise during subsequent attempts to find a 
solution to the problem. Skill based and rule based level error occur when humans use 
stored knowledge structures whereas knowledge based errors occur when such 
knowledge structures have been exhausted. Errors are much more likely to occur at 
the knowledge based level.  
For the properties specified for incident management the following classification 
scheme is used. Skill based properties are those properties that are part of the very 
basic training of incident management workers. For example, how to start the water 
pump on a fire truck. A property is classified as a rule based property in case an 
incident management plan literally includes the property. Finally, a property is called 
a knowledge based property in case an incident management plan states that a 
decision needs to be taken, but does not specify how to come to this solution. Using 
this classification scheme, none of the properties from Section 5 are routine based, 
whereas properties P1, P3, P5, P6, P8, P13, P14, P15, P16, P19, P22, and P24 are rule 
based properties. Finally, properties P7, P17, P18, P20, and P23 are knowledge base 
properties. Note that only the leaf properties are categorized as these are the 
properties that define the individual role behavior within the organization. 
In order to identify which types of error the different participants in the incident 
management organization are making, the following formula expressed in meta-TTL 
is used: 
Type Error ≡ 
∀γ:TRACE, t1, t2:TIME, A:AGENT, R:ROLE, P:DYNPROP, Q:DYNPROPEXPR, S:SITUATION, 
X:PROPERTY_TYPE 
[holds_in_period(has_role(A, R), γ, t1, t2) & 
 holds_in_period(S, γ, t1, t2) & 
 holds_in_period(relevant_for(P, R, S), γ, t1, t2) & 
 holds_in_period(type_for(P, R, X), γ, t1, t2) & 
 holds_in_period(has_specification(P, Q(R, γ, c1, c2)), γ, t1, t2) & 
 ¬holds(Q(R, γ, t1, t2))] 
⇒ makes_error_of_type(A, R, P, X, γ, t1, t2) 
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This expresses that if an agent A is allocated to a particular role R in a particular 
period between t1 and t2 in trace γ, and a situation S occurs in that same period in 
which property P is relevant for role R whereby the type of property P for role R is of 
type X (where X is either skill based, rule based or knowledge based), and the 
property has a specification which does not hold in the fragment of this trace, then an 
error of type X is made concerning property P by role R played by agent A.  
7   Case Study 
As a means to validate the approach presented above, a disaster which has been 
thoroughly investigated in the Netherlands is taken as a case study. The disaster 
concerns a bar fire which occurred in Volendam, the Netherlands, at New Years Night 
of the year 2001. The logs of the disaster have been thoroughly described in [7] and 
have been formalized using the approach presented in Section 3. Thereafter, the trace 
enrichment rules from Section 4 have been applied. A part of the resulting trace is 
shown in Figure 3, which uses the same ontology as used for the formalization of the 
properties in Section 5. On the left side of the Figure, the atoms are shown that occur 
during the incident management whereas the right side shows a timeline where a dark 
box indicates an atom being true at that time point and a gray box indicates the atom 
being false. The trace is used to verify whether the properties as specified in Section 5 
indeed hold for the Volendam disaster. The following properties were shown not to 
hold: P2, P4, P5, P7, P8, P9, P10, P14, and P20. In other words, in the Volendam case 
study the first ambulance did not comply to the global desired behavior because the 
information was not communicated properly, and because there exist time points at   
which nobody was present at the ambulance. Furthermore, the disaster staff was not 
activated properly because the mayor did not communicate that the disaster staff 
should be formed, and finally the ambulance routing of the police was incorrect, but 
luckily the direct routing of the health care services was satisfied. These results 
exactly comply to the conclusions in the disaster report [7] which resulted from a 
thorough investigation of a committee specialized in incident management.  
8   Discussion 
This paper presents an agent-based approach which can be used for error detection in 
incident management organizations. The approach consists of several parts. First, a 
formal approach for the specification of both traces and properties that can be verified 
against these traces is presented. In domains like incident management, traces might 
be incomplete. Therefore, enrichment rules for these traces are identified to cope with 
this incompleteness. Furthermore, the properties that ought to be verified against these 
traces can be specified in a hierarchical fashion: in case the highest level property is 
not satisfied, the cause of this dissatisfaction can be determined by looking at the 
properties one level deeper in the tree, which continues until a leaf property is found 
which is not satisfied. Finally, a classification mechanism is presented for the 
different properties based on psychological literature. In case an error is observed 
such a classification immediately gives insight in the functioning of a particular agent 
playing a role, which enables performing dedicated training sessions or giving 
appropriate warning messages. 
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In the future, the approach presented can be incorporated in personal agents of 
people involved in incident management. Such agents automatically log all incoming 
and outgoing information in the form of traces and have knowledge on the property 
the particular role the agent is playing is required to fulfill. In case properties are 
observed not to be satisfied, a reminder or warning can for instance be given to the 
person. Such agents can be useful for training sessions, as it can be observed what 
kind of mistakes a person typically makes, but could possibly even be used during 
actual incident management. 
In the field of information agents, support systems have also been developed for 
incident management (see e.g. [11]). In such systems however, the agents do not 
check whether errors are made, but simply provide people with information to make 
sure they are aware of their tasks. This does however not offer a mechanism to detect 
errors and avoid a chain of unwanted events. Approaches for e.g. detection of 
protocols (see e.g. [10]), also called overhearing, have been introduced. These 
approaches are however more focused on recognizing patterns, not on detection of 
errors. 
disaster(bar_fire_volendam)
situation(bar_fire_volendam)
physical_position(wounded, zeestraat)
physical_position(wounded, pellersplein)
output(cpa)|communication_from_to(cpa, operator, disaster(bar_fire_volendam))
output(operator)|communication_from_to(operator, rmc, disaster(bar_fire_volendam))
output(operator)|communication_from_to(operator, fd_volendam, disaster(bar_fire_volendam))
output(operator)|communication_from_to(operator, fd_edam, disaster(bar_fire_volendam))
output(operator)|communication_from_to(operator, fd_monnickendam, disaster(bar_fire_volendam))
output(operator)|communication_from_to(operator, vc2, disaster(bar_fire_volendam))
output(operator)|communication_from_to(operator, ladder_truck, disaster(bar_fire_volendam))
output(operator)|communication_from_to(operator, mayor, disaster(bar_fire_volendam))
output(operator)|communication_from_to(operator, ovd, disaster(bar_fire_volendam))
output(rmc)|communication_from_to(rmc, operator, physical_position(wounded, zeestraat))
output(operator)|communication_from_to(operator, ambulance, goto(zeestraat))
output(operator)|communication_from_to(operator, ecf734, disaster(bar_fire_volendam))
output(rmc)|communication_from_to(rmc, operator, physical_position(wounded, pellersplein))
output(operator)|communication_from_to(operator, fd_katwijk, disaster(bar_fire_volendam))
output(operator)|communication_from_to(operator, ambulance, goto(pellersplein))
output(operator)|communication_from_to(operator, second_operator, disaster(bar_fire_volendam))
output(operator)|communication_from_to(operator, fd_commander, disaster(bar_fire_volendam))
physical_position(ambulance, scene)
physical_position(ambulance, pellersplein)
physical_position(driver, ambulance)
physical_position(paramedic, ambulance)
alarm_lights(ambulance, green)
investigating(paramedic)
physical_position(mayor, scene)
physical_position(odh, scene)
output(paramedic)|communication_from_to(paramedic, driver, situation_description(bar_fire_volendam))
output(operator)|communication_from_to(operator, hospital, disaster(bar_fire_volendam))
output(operator)|communication_from_to(operator, doctor_service, disaster(bar_fire_volendam))
output(operator)|communication_from_to(operator, undertaker, disaster(bar_fire_volendam))
output(police)|communication_from_to(police, cpa, route_plan(zuideinde))
physical_position(ambulance, zeestraat)
physical_position(wounded_nest_zuideinde, scene)
physical_position(wounded_nest_pellerplein, scene)
route_passes_wounded_nest(route_plan(pellersplein), wounded_nest_pellersplein)
output(police)|communication_from_to(police, cpa, route_plan(pellersplein))
output(operator)|communication_from_to(operator, civil_servant_disasters, disaster(bar_fire_volendam))
output(operator)|communication_from_to(operator, neighboring_building, disaster(bar_fire_volendam))
time 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Fig.3. Partial trace of the Volendam case study 
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Error detection itself is another related research field. In [3] behavioral properties 
for a parallel computing system can be specified, and can be checked on the fly. The 
properties are however specified as simple sequences of states, whereas the TTL 
language as used in this paper has the ability to express timing parameters between 
these states, often a necessity in incident management. In [5] properties for error 
detection are specified by means of a finite state machine which again does not allow 
for time parameter specification. 
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